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Herbert Gintis, Carel van Schaik and Christopher Boehm
January 8, 2018
We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality,
tied in a single garment of destiny.
Martin Luther King
There is no such thing as society. There are individual men
and women, and there are families.
Margaret Thatcher
C: On what is power based in chimpanzee society?
HG: The physical prowess of the alpha male.
C: On what was power based in the societies of our
human ancestors?
HG: On the power to persuade and to lead creatively.
C: How do you know this?
HG: The short answer is that humans are extremely
gracile and delicate, with only a small fraction
of the physical power of other primate species.
For the long answer, read on.
Choreographer interview
1 ACCOUNTING FOR HUMAN EXCEPTIONALISM
We deploy the most up-to-date evidence available in various behavioral fields in
support of the following hypothesis: The emergence of bipedalism and coopera-
tive breeding in the hominin line, together with environmental developments that
made a diet of meat from large animals adaptive, as well as cultural innovations
in the form of fire, cooking, and lethal weapons, created a niche for hominins in
which there was a significant advantage to individuals with the ability to commu-
nicate and persuade in a moral context.1 These forces added a unique political
dimension to human social life which, through gene-culture coevolution, became
Homo ludens—Man, the game player—with the power to conserve and transform
1This is an updated version of a paper that appeared in Current Anthropology 56,3 (2015)
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the social order. Homo sapiens became, in the words of Aristotle’s Nicomachean
Ethics, a zoon politikon.
Strong social interdependence plus the availability of lethal weapons in early
hominin society undermined the standard social dominance hierarchy, based on
pure physical prowess, of multi-male/multi-female primate groups, characteristic,
for instance, of chimpanzees. The successful political structure that ultimately re-
placed the ancestral social dominance hierarchy was an egalitarian political system
in which the group controlled its leaders. Group success depended both on the
ability of leaders to persuade and motivate, and of followers to submit to a consen-
sual decision process. The heightened social value of non-authoritarian leadership
entailed enhanced biological fitness for such traits as linguistic facility, political
ability, and indeed for human hypercognition itself.
This egalitarian political system persisted until cultural changes in theHolocene
fostered the accumulation of material wealth, through which it became possible
again to sustain a social dominance hierarchy with strong authoritarian leaders
atop.
2 MODELS OF POLITICAL POWER
The behavioral sciences during the second half of the twentieth century were dom-
inated by two highly contrasting models of human political behavior. In biology,
political science, and economics, a Homo economicus self-interest model held
sway. In this model, individuals are rational self-regarding maximizers (Downs
1957, Alexander 1987, Mas-Colell et al. 1995). Sociology, social psychology, and
anthropology, by contrast, embraced a cultural hegemony model. In this model,
individuals internalize the cultural principles of the society in which they operate.
In this view, a dominant culture supplies the norms and values associated with
role-performance, and individual behavior meets the requirements of the various
roles individuals are called upon to play in daily life (Durkheim 1902, Mead 1963,
Parsons 1967). Contemporary research has been kind to neither model.
Contra cultural hegemony theory, daily life provides countless examples of
the fragility of dominant cultures. African Americans in the era of the civil rights
movement, for instance, rejected a powerful ideology justifying segregation, Amer-
ican women in the 1960s rejected a deep-rooted patriarchal culture, and gay Ameri-
cans rejected traditional Judeo-Christian treatments of homosexuality. In succeed-
ing years, each of these minority counter-cultures was adopted by the American
public at large. In the Soviet Union, Communist leaders attempted to forge a
dominant culture of socialist morality by subjecting two generations of citizens
to intensive indoctrination. This effort was unsuccessful, and was rejected rather
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decisively, immediately following the fall of the Soviet regime. Similar examples
can be given from political experience in many other societies.
There has always been an undercurrent of objection to the cultural hegemony
model, which Dennis Wrong (1961) aptly called the “oversocialized conception of
man.” Konrad Lorenz (1963), Robert Ardrey (1997[1966]), and Desmond Morris
(1999[1967]) offered behavioral ecology alternatives, a line of thought culminat-
ing in Edward O. Wilson’s Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975), the resur-
rection of human nature by Donald Brown (1991), and Leda Cosmides and John
Tooby’s withering attack in The Adapted Mind on the so-called “standard social
science model” of cultural hegemony (Barkow et al. 1992). Meanwhile, the ana-
lytical foundations of an alternative model, that of gene-culture coevolution, were
laid by Geertz (1962), Dobzhansky (1963), Wallace (1970), Lumsden and Wilson
(1981), Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1973, 1981), and Boyd and Richerson (1985),
Durham (1991). This gene-culture coevolution model informs our analysis of the
evolution of human socio-political systems.
Undermining the self-interest model began in economics with the advent of
game theory, which models the behavior of individuals when the payoff to each
depends on the strategic interaction of all. Of particular importance was the ul-
timatum game experiments of Gu¨th et al. (1982) and Roth et al. (1991). In the
ultimatum game, one subject, called the “proposer,” is presented with a sum of
money, say $10, and is instructed to offer any portion of this, from nothing to the
full $10, to a second subject, called the “responder.” The two subjects never learn
each other’s identity, and the game is played only once. The responder, who knows
that the total amount to be shared is $10, can either accept the offer or reject it. If
the responder accepts the offer, the money is shared accordingly. If the responder
rejects the offer, both players receive nothing. If the players care only about their
own payoffs and have no concern for fairness (i.e., they are self-interested), a ra-
tional responder will always accept any positive amount of money. Knowing this,
a rational proposer will offer $1, and this will be accepted.
When the ultimatum game is actually played, however, this self-interested out-
come is almost never observed and rarely even approximated. In many replica-
tions of this experiment in more than 30 countries, under varying conditions and in
some cases with substantial amounts of money at stake, proposers routinely offer
responders very generous shares, 50% of the total generally being the modal of-
fer. Responders frequently reject offers below 25% (Roth et al. 1991, Camerer and
Thaler 1995, Camerer 2003, Oosterbeek et al. 2004).
In post-game debriefings, responders who have rejected low offers often ex-
press anger at the proposer’s greed and a desire to penalize unfair behavior. The
fact that positive offers are commonly rejected shows that responders have fairness
concerns, and the fact that most proposers offer between 40% and 50% of the pie
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shows that proposers too have fairness concerns themselves, or at least understand
that responders’ fairness concerns would motivate them to reject low offers. Of
special interest are those who reject positive offers. The explanation most consis-
tent with the data is that they are motivated by a desire to punish the proposer for
being unfair, even though it means giving up some money to do so. While initially
considered odd, these and other experimental results violating the self-interest ax-
iom are now commonplace.
These and related findings have led in recent years to a revision of the received
wisdom in biology and economics towards the appreciation of the central impor-
tance of other-regarding preferences and character virtues in biological and eco-
nomic theory (Gintis et al. 2005, Henrich et al. 2005, Okasha and Binmore 2012).
It might reasonably be thought, however, that these behaviors are the product of the
culture of advanced complex societies. To assess this possibility, a team of anthro-
pologists ran ultimatum game experiments in which the subject pool consisted of
members of fifteen small-scale societies with little contact with markets, govern-
ments, or modern institutions (Henrich et al. 2004). The fifteen societies included
hunter-gatherers, herders, and low technology farmers.
This study found that many small-scale societies mirror the results of the ad-
vanced economies, but others did not. Among the Au and Gnau people in Papua
New Guinea, ultimatum game offers of more than half the pie were common.
Moreover, while even splits were commonly accepted, both higher and lower offers
were rejected with about equal frequency. This behavior is not surprising in light
of the widespread practice of competitive gift giving as a means of establishing sta-
tus and subordinacy in these and many other New Guinea societies. By contrast,
among the Machiguenga in Amazonian Peru, almost three-quarters of the offers
were a quarter of the pie or less and yet there was just a single rejection among
70 offers. This pattern was strikingly different from the standard experiments in
advanced economies. However, even among the Machiguenga, the mean offer was
27.5%, far more than would have maximized the proposer’s payoffs given the scant
likelihood of a rejection.
Analysis of the experiments led to the following conclusions: (a) behaviors
are highly variable across groups; (b) not a single group conformed to or even
approximated the model of self-interested agents; and (c) despite the anonymous
and asocial setting of the experiments, between-group differences in behavior re-
flected differences in the kinds of social interaction experienced in everyday life;
i.e., people generally conform to cultural rules of their societies even when there is
no chance a deviation will be punished.
The evidence for this latter conclusion is compelling. For example, the Ache´
in Paraguay share equally among all group members some kinds of food (meat
and honey) acquired through hunting and gathering. In our experiment, most Ache´
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proposers contributed half the pie or more. Similarly, among the Lamalera whale
hunters of Indonesia, who hunt in large crews and divide their catch according to
strict sharing rules, the proposer’s average allocation to the responder was 58%
of the pie. Moreover, the Indonesian whale hunters played the game very differ-
ently from the Indonesian university students who were the subjects in another set
of experiments (Cameron 1999). Indeed, where voluntary public goods provision
was customary in real life (for example, the Harambee system among the Orma
herders in Kenya, whereby individuals contribute resources to build a school or
repair a road), contributions in the experimental public goods game were patterned
after actual contributions in the actual Harambee system. Those with more cattle
contributed more. By contrast, in the ultimatum game, for which there apparently
was no everyday life analogue, the wealthy and non-wealthy Orma behaved simi-
larly.
3 THE MORAL BASIS OF MODERN POLITICAL SYSTEMS
The untenability of the self-interest model of human action is also clear from ev-
eryday experience. Political activity in modern democratic societies provides un-
ambiguous evidence. Note that in large elections, the rational self-regarding agent
will not vote because the costs of voting are positive and significant, but the proba-
bility that one vote will alter the outcome of the election is vanishingly small, and
adding a single vote to the total of a winning candidate enhances the winner’s po-
litical efficacy at best an infinitesimal amount (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Thus
the personal gain from voting is too small to motivate behavior. For similar rea-
sons, if one chooses to vote, there is no plausible reason to vote on the basis of the
impact of the outcome of the election on one’s personal material gains. It follows
also that the voter, if rational, self-regarding, and incapable of personally influenc-
ing the opinions of more than a few others, will not bother to form opinions on
political issues, because these opinions cannot affect the outcome of elections. Yet
people do vote, and many do expend time and energy in forming political opinions.
Although voters do appear to behave strategically (Fedderson and Sandroni 2006),
their behavior does not conform either to the self-interest model (Edlin et al. 2007)
or the rational actor model of contemporary decision theory (Savage 1954).
It also follows from the logic of self-regarding political behavior that rational
self-regarding individuals will not participate in the sort of collective actions that
are responsible for the growth in the world of representative and democratic gov-
ernance, the respect for civil liberties, the rights of minorities and gender equality
in public life, and the like. In the self-interest model, only small groups aspiring
for social dominance will act politically. Yet modern egalitarian political institu-
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tions are the result of such collective actions (Bowles and Gintis 1986, Giugni et
al. 1998). This behavior cannot be explained by the self-interest model.
Except for professional politicians and socially influential individuals, electoral
politics is a vast morality play to which models of the rational self-regarding ac-
tor are not only a poor fit, but are conceptually bizarre. It took Mancur Olson’s
The Logic of Collective Action (1965) to make this clear to many behavioral scien-
tists, because virtually all students of social life had assumed without reflection the
faulty logic that rational self-regarding individuals will vote, and will “vote their
interests” (Downs 1957).
Defenders of the Homo economicus model may respond that voters believe
their votes make a difference, however untenable this belief might be under logical
scrutiny. Indeed, when asked why they vote, voters’ common response is that they
are trying to help get one or another party elected to office. When appraised of the
illogical character of that response, the common reply is that there are in fact close
elections, where the balance is tipped in one direction or another by only a few
hundred votes. When confronted with the fact that one vote will not affect even
such close elections, the common repost is, “Well, if everyone thought like that,
we couldn’t run a democracy.”
Politically active and informed citizens appear to operate on the principle that
voting is a prerogative of citizenship, an altruistic act that is governed by the cat-
egorical imperative: act in conformance with the morally correct behavior for in-
dividuals in one’s position, without regard to personal costs and benefits. Such
mental reasoning, which is built on our urge to conform and our shared inten-
tionality (Tomasello and Carpent r 2007), is implicated in many uniquely human
cognitive characteristics, including cumulative culture and language (Sugden 2003,
Bacharach 2006). Shared intentionality rests on a fundamentally prosocial dispo-
sition (Gilbert 1987, Bratman 1993, Tomasello and Carpenter 2007, Hrdy 2009).
4 THE SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF PRIMATE SOCIETIES
Humans are one of more than two hundred extant species belonging to the Pri-
mate order. All primates have socio-political systems for regulating social life
within their communities. Understanding human socio-political organization in-
volves specifying how and why humans are similar to and differ from other social
species in general, and other primate species in particular.
Concerning the latter, there are two major sources of information. First, some
traits are distributedwidely and linked to other well-known traits, and thus were al-
most certainly already present before humans evolved. For instance, many primate
species, including humans and our closest living relatives, seek to dominate others
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and are adept at forming coalitions. It is thus likely that their most recent common
ancestor also possessed these traits. Dominance-seeking and coalition-formation in
humans, then, are not purely cultural. Rather, humans are endowedwith the genetic
prerequisites for this behavior, as are numerous other primate species (Wrangham
and Peterson 1996).
A second source is similarity with our close relatives, the great apes, and
especially the genus Pan (chimpanzees and bonobos). Most nonhuman primate
species have great trouble in acting collectively in conflict with neighboring groups
(Willems et al. 2013). Chimpanzees are a major exception: they engage in war-like
raids where larger parties cooperate closely to target and destroymuch smaller ones
(Goodall 1986; Wilson 2012). War among human hunter-gatherers likewise largely
consists of such a raiding strategy (Keeley 1996), suggesting a shared predisposi-
tion to engage in this type of warfare (Wrangham and Glowacki 2012). Obviously,
the dramatic changes in human social organization accompanying the origin of de-
fensible wealth (discussed below) producedmajor changes in the nature of warfare,
linked to additional genetic predispositions, such as insider favoritism (LeVine and
Campbell 1972; Otterbein 2004; Bowles 2006, 2007, 2009; Bowles and Gintis
2011).
Using this logic, we can examine the social structure of multi-male/multi-
female primate societies (deWaal 1997, Maestripieri 2007) to identify the elements
of human socio-political organization that were already likely present among the
first hominins.
Primates live in groups to reduce the risk of predation (Alexander 1974, van
Schaik 1983), exchange information about food location (Eisenberg et al. 1972,
Clutton-Brock 1974), and defend food sources and mates against competing groups
(Wrangham 1980). These groups, however, rarely engage in organized collective
action. As a result, the primate form of group living has only limited need for
leaders, that is, individuals instrumental in initiating and coordinating group-level
action with the approval and support of other group members. Instead, individuals
vary in dominance based on motivation and pure physical prowess, and dominant
males gain fitness at the expense of subordinate members of the group. This is
especially true for our closest relatives, the genus Pan. As King et al. (2009) stress,
other species do often have foraging leaders, but their power is based on hierar-
chical dominance rather than consensus. Despite the fact that such leaders of the
hunt appropriate most of the spoils, followers must stick with the group to avoid
predation while grabbing what little of the catch they can (King et al. 2008, Krauss
et al. 2009).
In most primate species, both sexes form dominance hierarchies, in whichmore
dominant individuals gain privileged access to food and mates, and as a result
tend to have higher fitness (Vigilant et al. 2001, Maestripieri 2007, Majolo et al.
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2012). In many primate species, dominant females depend on alliances to maintain
their position, whereas the same is true for males in far fewer primate species
(van Schaik 1996), most notably chimpanzees. Thus dominants rarely perform any
group-level beneficial acts. One exception is male displays toward predators, a
behavior seen in a variety of primate species, and generally linked to the protection
of likely offspring. Another is triadic power interventions (e.g., Boehm 1994 and
deWaal 1996) that end conflicts in apes and certain monkey species.
4.1 The Origins of Primate Socio-political Structure
Given the variety of contemporary primate socio-political structures, what can we
say about the social structure of the most recent common ancestor of contemporary
primates, the species from which the hominin species leading ltimately to Homo
sapiens branched off? Our answer is based on the fact that traits shared by sev-
eral closely related species were very likely shared by their most recent common
ancestor. The challenge is that primates exhibit a wide variety of socio-political
structures. However, if we limit our sample to species living in woodlands and
open savannah that engage in collective defense and confrontational scavenging
from large carnivores, which was the probable condition faced by the primates’
most recent common ancestor, all extant species live in large, multi-male/multi-
female groups.2 Thus at least from Homo habilis on, hominins likely lived in large
multi-male/multi-female groups (Foley 1996, Dunbar 2005).
Recently, sophisticated phylogenetic approaches have added precision to these
inferences by reconstructing the origin of various kinds of social organization in
deep time (Silk 2011). Shultz et al. (2011) completed a study based on the ge-
netic distances and phenotypic social-structural similarities of 217 extant primate
species, the most recent common ancestor of which is far more ancient than the
ancestral Pan. Shultz et al. show that social organization tends to be similar among
closely related species, which implies that social structure is determined largely by
genes rather than environment in nonhuman primates. This finding runs counter to
the alternative assumption that primate social structure is a response to the distri-
bution of food resources or risks and is not affected by phylogenetic affiliation.
Shultz et al. (2011) conclude that the earliest primates lived some 72 Mya as
solitary foraging individualswho came together only formating. Multi-male/multi-
female aggregations appeared some 52 Mya. We can infer from the social struc-
ture of contemporary nonhuman primate species living in multi-male/multi-female
2The grass- and savannah-living Patas monkey (Hall 1965) is the single exception to the rule that
savannah-living primates exhibit a multi-male/multi-female social structure. They avoid predators
by staying in trees as much as possible, cryptic behavior, wide group spread, and rapid , with the
alpha male acting as a decoy.
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groups that mating was promiscuous and males formed a hierarchical power struc-
ture with a single alpha male at the apex. Indeed, most nonhuman primates that live
in multi-male groups today exhibit this living pattern (Chapais 2008). While this
social structure is highly stable and has persisted into the present, when suitably
stressed it broke down into two social forms in which a social group included only
one male. The first, which may have appeared about 16 Mya, was the single-male
harem while the second, appearing about the same time, was single pair-living.
The implication is that the earliest hominids lived in multi-male/multi-female
promiscuous social bands, so Pan are archetypical species when it comes to recon-
structing the origins of the human political system. Dominant male chimpanzees
provide little leadership, and they provide virtually no parenting. In many primate
species, dominant males have sufficiently high paternity certainty to induce them
to provide protection to infants (Paul et al. 2000), but in chimpanzees paternity
is much less concentrated in top-ranked males (Vigilant et al. 2001, Boesch et al.
2006), most likely because chimpanzee females prefer multiple matings and can-
not be controlled by dominant males. Thus males tend to ignore rearing the young.
The only clear service dominant males provide to the group is keeping the peace
by intervening in disputes and leading predator mobbing (de Waal 1997, von Rohr
et al. 2012). In short, the political structure of chimpanzee society, like that of
primates generally, is largely a system for funneling fitness-enhancing resources to
the apex of a social dominance hierarchy based on physical prowess and coalition-
building talent. This holds basically for the bonobo as well, where monopolization
of matings by particular males is even lower.
4.2 Primate Coalitional Politics
Chimpanzee males rely significantly on coalitions and alliances. There are two
major types of coalition: rank-changing and leveling (Pandit and van Schaik 2003,
van Schaik et al. 2006). Rank-changing occurs when a male relies on supporters
to acquire and maintain hegemony (Goodall 1964, Nishida and Hosaka 1996, de
Waal 1998), and hence may not have the highest individual fighting ability (de
Waal 1998, Boesch et al. 1998). Leveling occurs when multiple lower-ranking
males form coalitions to prevent the top male or males from appropriating too
large a share of the resources. These coalitions do not change the dominance ranks
of the participants. Females similarly form such leveling coalitions to counter the
arbitrary power of dominant males, especially in captivity (Goodall 1986).
This pattern of political power based on the hierarchical dominance of the phys-
ically powerful along with a system of sophisticated political alliances to preserve
or to limit the power of the alpha male (Boehm and Flack 2010) is carried over, yet
fundamentally transformed, in human society (Knauft 1991; Boehm 2000).
9
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The best predictor for male-male coalitions among primates is simply the fact
that multiple males find themselves together and no single male can fully monop-
olize all matings (Bissonnette et al. 2014). Thus, there are broad similarities in
social dominance and coalition-formation across all multi-male/multi-female pri-
mate species. This fact runs counter to traditional political theory. Aristotle’s zoon
politikon notwithstanding, political theorists have widely assumed that political
structure involves purely cultural evolution, whereas the primate data show roots
to political behavior going back millions of years. The primate evidence is im-
portant because it lays the basis for an evolutionary analysis of human political
systems (de Waal 1998). Such an analysis may elucidate the role of basic human
political predispositions in reinforcing and undermining distinct sorts of human
socio-political structures.
5 THE EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY OF PRIMATE SOCIETIES
It would be useful to be able to read ancient social structure from the historical
record. But we cannot. The fossil record provides the most concrete answers to
our evolutionary history, but is highly incomplete. There are, for instance, skeletal
records of only about 500 individuals from our hominin past. Moreover, behavior
does not fossilize and social structure leaves no direct marks in the earth. This is
why we must resort to the relationship between phylogenetic proximity and social
organization in living primate species (Shultz et al. 2011).
The hominin lineage branched off from the primate main stem some 6.5 mil-
lion years ago or earlier (Wood 2010, Langergraber 2012). The watershed event in
the hominin line was the emergence of bipedalism. Bipedalism is well-developed
in Australopithecus afarensis, which appeared three million years after the origin
of the hominin lineage. Homo ergaster (2.0 to 1.3 Mya) or Homo erectus (1.9 to
0.143 Mya) was the first currently documented specialized biped, having a rela-
tively short arm/leg ratio that rendered brachiation infeasible.
Bipedalism in hominins was critically dependent upon the prior adaptation of
the primate upper torso to life in the trees. The Miocene Hominoid apes were not
true quadrupeds, but rather had specialized shoulder and arm muscles for swinging
and climbing, as well as a specialized hand structure for grasping branches and
manipulating leaves, insects, and fruit. When the hominin line was freed from the
exigencies of arboreal life, the locomotor function of the upper limbs was reduced,
so they could be reorganized for manipulative and projectile control purposes. Both
a more efficient form of bipedalismand the further transformation of the arm, hand,
and upper torso became possible.
Non-hominin primate species are capable of walking on hind legs, but only
10
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with difficulty and for short periods of time. Chimpanzees, for instance, cannot
straighten their legs, and require constant muscular exertion to support the body.
Moreover, the center of gravity of the chimpanzee body must shift with each step,
leading to a pronounced lumberingmotion with significant side-to-sidemomentum
shifts (O’Neil 2012). The hominin pelvis was shortened from top to bottom and,
by the time Homo ergaster emerged, had been rendered bowl-shaped to facilitate
terrestrial locomotion without sideward movement, the hominin leg bones became
sturdy, the leg muscles were strengthened to permit running, and the development
of arches in the feet facilitated a low-impact transfer of weight from leg to leg
(Bramble and Lieberman 2004). The specialized form of bipedality that arose
around 2 Mya thus facilitates running efficiently for great distances, although not
approaching the speed of many large four-footed mammals.
Today we celebrate specialized bipedality as the basis for human upper-body
physical and psychomotor capacities for crafting tools and handicrafts. But another
major contribution of these capacities, as we explain below, was for fashioning and
using lethal weapons.
6 FIRE AND SOCIAL SHARING
The hominin control of fire cannot be accurately dated. We have firm evidence
from about 400,000 years ago in Europe (Roebroeks and Villa 2011), and about
800,000 years ago in Israel (Alperson-Afil 2008), but it is likely that this key event
had originated in Africa much earlier (Gowlett and Wrangham 2013). The control
of fire had strong effects on hominin cultural and phylogenetic evolution. First,
the transition to specialized bipedality is much easier to understand if the hominins
that experienced this transition had control of fire (Wrangham and Carmody 2010).
Prior to the control of fire, humans almost certainly took to the trees at night like
most other primates, as a defense against predators. Because predators have an
instinctive fear of fire, the control of fire permitted hominins, who were already
bipedal, to abandon climbing almost completely.
Second, the practice of cooking food was a related cultural innovation with
broad gene- ulture coevolutionary implications. Cooking favors a central location
to which the catch is transported, and hence requires abandoning the competitive,
socially uncoordinated “tolerated theft” distribution of calories typical of food-
sharing in nonhuman primate species, in favor of a distribution based on widely
agreed-upon fairness norms (Isaac 1977, Blurton-Jones 1987). This major socio-
psychological transitionwas probably made possible by the adoption of some form
of cooperative breeding and hunting among hominins that had begun by the time
Homo erectus emerged (Burkart and van Schaik 2010). In sum, while the early
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advent of cooking is not yet firmly established, it is likely that the control of fire
and the practice of cooking were an important precondition of the emergence of a
human moral order.
Hominins with access to cooked food did not require the large colon charac-
teristic of other primates, which allowed them to reduce the amount of time spent
chewing food from the four to seven hours a day characteristic of the great apes, to
about one hour per day. With a smaller gut, less need for chewing, and more rapid
digestion, hominins were liberated to develop their aerobic capacity and perfect
their running ability (Wrangham and Carmody 2010).
7 FROM GATHERER TO SCAVENGER
Beginning around 2.5 million years ago there was a major forking in the evolu-
tionary path of our possible ancestors. The Australopithecines branched in at least
two—perhaps more but the fossil record in this area is quite incomplete—very
different evolutionary directions. One led to the robust Australopithecines and a
genetic dead-end by about 1.4 million years ago, and the other very likely led to
the first humans.
These diverging evolutionary paths appear to have been the response to novel
environmental challenges. Coinciding with this hominin divergence was a shift
in the global climate to frequently fluctuating conditions. Early hominins suc-
ceeded by learning to exploit the increased climatic instability (Potts 1996, 1998;
Richerson et al. 2001; O’Connell et al. 2002).3 The resulting adaptations en-
hanced hominin cognitive and socio-structural versatility. “Early bipedality, stone
transport,. . . encephalization, and enhanced cognitive and social functioning,” Potts
(1998) argues, “all may reflect adaptations to environmental novelty and highly
varying selective contexts.”
A diet based significantly on the flesh and bone marrow of large animals pro-
vided a niche for emerging hominins quite distinct from that of other primates and
thus selected for the traits that most distinguish humans from apes. This much
was clear to Darwin in The Descent of Man (1871). However, until recently, most
paleoanthropologists assumed that prey was acquired through hunting from the
Australopithecine outset (Dart 1925; Lee and DeVore 1968; but see Binford 1985).
3DeMenocal (2011) notes that Darwin (1859) long ago speculated on the role of climate change
in human evolution, as did Dart (1925), and that modern findings support the importance of climate-
based selection pressures (Vrba 1995; Potts 1998), and specifically, climate variability. Potts (1998)
examined the environmental records of several hominin localities, finding that habitat-specific hy-
potheses are disconfirmed by the evidence. By contrast, the variability selection hypothesis, which
states that large disparities in environmental conditions were responsible for important episodes of
adaptive evolution, was widely supported.
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In fact, it now appears that early hominins, in the transition from the Pliocene to the
Pleistocene, were more likely scavenger-gatherers than hunter-gatherers, of which
there is firm evidence dating from 3.4 Mya (McPherron 2010).
The first proponents of early hominins as scavengers believed that the scaveng-
ing was “passive,” in that small groups of hominins took possession of carcasses
only after other predators, upon being sated, abandoned their prey (Binford 1985,
Blumenschine et al. 1994), but more recent evidence suggests the prevalence of
“competitive” or “power” scavenging, in which organized groups of humans sport-
ing primitive weapons chased the killers and appropriated carcasses in relatively
intact shape (Dominguez-Rodrigoa and Barba 2006). The implicit argument is
that the combination of coordinated collective action and the lethal weapons of the
period were sufficient to drive off other predators, and hence presumably to kill
certain live prey as well. While a large prey can be driven off a cliff or trapped in a
box canyon, it requires powerful weapons to cripple or kill a large predator. Before
the advent of poisoned stone-tipped spears and arrows, the active pursuit of large
prey was likely impossible (Sahle et al. 2013). The earliest known use of wooden
javelins (Keeley and Toth 1981, Thieme 1997) suggests medium-size prey.
Flaked stone toolmaking, butchering large animals, and expanded cranial ca-
pacity all appear around 3.4 Mya (McPherron 2010), but there is no evidence that
Australopithecines hunted large game. Australopithecus and Homo habilis were
in fact quite small, adult males weighing under 100 pounds and females about
75 pounds. Their tools were primitive, consisting of stone scrapers and rough
hammerstones. They therefore lacked the sophisticated weapons for hunting large
and swift-moving prey, and hence are unlikely to have hunted effectively, but they
could well have scavenged. Modern chimpanzees and baboons are known to scav-
enge the kills of cheetahs and leopards (Medina 2007), so this behavior was likely
in the repertoire of the earliest hominins. With highly cooperative and carefully
coordinated maneuvers by use of weapons, they could have chased away even the
most ferocious predators.
Hunting and scavenging small animals is not cost-effective for large nonhu-
man primates, while scavenging large animals requires group participation and
efficiently coordinated cooperation, both in organizing an attack on predators feed-
ing on a large prey, and protecting against predators while processing and consum-
ing the carcass (Isaac 1978). Moreover, use of stones as weapons that might be
used to scare off other predators and scavengers (Isaac 1987) has been questioned
(Whittaker and McCall 2001), but most likely there was an array of tools made
of softer materials, very probably including wooden spears, suitable for making
bluffing attacks.
Unlike wooden weapons, stones could have been carefully amassed at strate-
gic sites within a large scavenging area, so that when a scouting party located an
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appropriate food object to scavenge, it could call others to haul the stones to the
site of the carcass, as a strategic operation preceding its appropriation (Isaac 1977).
These could have been the first lethal weapons, but carrying wooden spears or clubs
would have served equally well to intimidate competing predators, and also would
have been useful in killing small game.
8 PRIMITIVE LETHAL WEAPONS
Stones are used today in certain contexts by hunter-gatherers as found-objects, and
possibly as fashioned projectiles. Barbara Isaac (1987) studied stones used by re-
cent foragers, also found in concentrations at Olduvai sites by Mary Leakey (1971),
some of which were carefully finished spheroids. She observes that the size and
shapes of the Olduvai stones render them appropriate, to use for throwing. Recent
foragers do use found-object stones quite effectively as fighting weapons. Isaac
(1987) has documented devastating attacks by hunter-gatherers against early en-
croaching Europeans, when intensive stoning actually proved more effective than
musketry in rapidly inflicting serious casualties. This took place at contact in vari-
ous parts of the world, so the traditions were likely pre-existing.
In Africa, behaviorally modern humans could have used long-range projectile
weaponry (atlatl darts and arrows) in conflict for at least 50,000 years (Shea 2006;
Ambrose 2008; Wadley et al. 2009; Wynn 2009; Wilkins et al. 2012; Roach et al.
2013). The recent hunting evidence includes a Levalloisian spear point embedded
in a prey skeleton (Boe¨da et al. 1999). Group conflict likely accounts for the lim-
ited sampling we do have for humans of Pleistocene death-by-projectiles (Keeley
1996; Thorpe 2003), which includes at Grimaldi a child with a point embedded in
its spine (27,000-36,000 BP), in the former Czechoslovakia weapons traumas and
cranial fractures on adult males (24,000-35,000 BP), in Egypt an adult male with
a point embedded in his arm (20,000 BP), and a Nubian cemetery where 40% of
the interred exhibited weapon traumas (12,000-14,000 BP). Tacon and Chippen-
dale (1994) have documented Australian rock art dating back to 10,000 BP that
depicts armed combat, with increasing numbers of combatants by 4000 BP. In the
Holocene armed combat is well-documented and widespread, as in the work of
Lambert (1997) on the remains of California Indians which exhibit plentiful head
injuries and parrying fractures.
If behaviorally modern human beings have used long-range projectile weapons
against prey for at least 50,000 years, doubtless they sometimes turned such weapons
against other humans over the same period. A special instance of weapon use is
documented in art from Spain’s Remigia cave. Human stick figures are shown
standing with bows held about their heads while a male lies on the ground with
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the same number of arrows pincushioning him. There are ten men in the largest of
the groups. This may express a group execution theme, or possibly a raid carrying
out an act of revenge (see Otterbein 2004). This art appears to date to the early
Neolithic.
Technological developments such as atlatls, bows and arrows, shields, and
body armor are all relatively recent. It has been widely suggested that the ad-
vent of the spear-thrower (atlatl) arrived rather late, about 30,000 BP, and the bow
and arrow later still (e.g., Klein 1999). But there are recent reports (Lombard and
Phillipson 2010) suggesting that bows and arrows may have been in use as early
as about 60,000 BP. Some contemporary groups use poisoned projectiles, and their
use in prehistory is now susceptible to study (d’Errico et al. 2012), but further
research is needed.
This picture of Pleistocene weapon use is supported by the fact that the fos-
sils of large animals that have markings on bones indicating hominin flaying and
scraping with flaked stone tools are often found with stones that originated sev-
eral kilometers away. Contemporary chimpanzees carry stones to nut-bearing trees
that they use to crack the nuts (Boesch and Boesch-Achermann 2000), so this be-
havior was likely available to Australopithecines. Chimpanzees, however, carry
stones only several hundred meters at most, whereas Homo habilis scavengers car-
ried stones as far as ten kilometers, probably because they had invented portable
containers (McGrew 1992).
Neither the Oldowan tools of the early period nor the later and more sophis-
ticated Acheulean tools, which are found from the early Pleistocene up to about
200,000 years ago, show any sign of being useful as hunting weapons. However,
besides stones, human power scavengers of 500,000 years ago probably had sharp-
ened and fire-hardened spears to ward off competitive scavengers and threatening
predators, at least after the domestication of fire (Thieme 1997). These weapons
could also have been used against conspecifics. By contrast, nonhuman primates
use tools, but they do not use weapons in conflictual encounters (Huffman and
Kalunde 1993, McGrew 2004). In these species there is simply no record of a
fashioned or found-object weapon being used to injure or kill a conspecific.
The cognitive potential to invent and use lethal weapons is likely present in
the two Pan species. However, in nature bonobos and chimpanzees fashion tools
for extraction of insect or plant foods, while in both species intimidation dis-
plays merely involve found objects being brandished or dragged. Chimpanzees
use sticks fashioned from tree branches to impale bushbabies in their tree hollow
hiding places (Pruetz and Bertolani 2007, Gibbons 2007), so the use of sharpened
sticks was thus likely within the cognitive capacity of Homo habilis. However,
there is a considerable distance between using sharp sticks as impaling devices and
as well-aimed projectiles (Nishida 1973).
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The first dedicated and unambiguously lethal weapons to appear with excellent
preservation in the archeological record are the multiple all-wooden spears docu-
mented by Thieme (1997) at Scho¨ningen, with over a dozen butchered wild horses
and some bison located nearby. These javelins are both streamlined aerodynam-
ically and well-balanced for effective throwing so they were projectile weapons
capable of bringing down medium-sized game at a distance. They also provide
a defense against dangerous prey, and they offer hunters a means of threatening
other predators away from their kills. These considerations suggest that a paleo-
record of lithic weaponry alone is seriously incomplete. What the lithic record
does suggest, in its Acheulian continuity, is that this tradition of making wooden
spears might also have had great longevity (see Kelly 2005). The emergence of
lethal weapons was likely important in the evolution of hominin social organization
(Roach et al. 2013). In hunter-gatherer conflicts hunting weapons quickly become
lethal, and even an outnumbered victim can inflict casualties (Lee 1979; see also
Churchill and Rhodes 2009). Bingham (1999), Gintis (2000), Bingham and Souza
(2009), and Boyd et al. (2010) stress the importance of the superior physical and
psychomotor capacities of humans in clubbing and throwing projectiles as com-
pared with other primates, citing Goodall (1964) and Plooij (1978) on the relative
advantage of humans. Darlington (1975), Fifer (1987), and Isaac (1987) docu-
ment the importance of these traits in human evolution. Bingham (1999), Boehm
(1997), and Okada and Bingham (2008) document that humans have developed
the ability to carry out collective punishment against norm violators, thus radically
lowering the cost of punishing transgressors. Calvin (1983) argues that humans are
unique in possessing the neural machinery for rapid manual-brachial movements
that both allows for precision stone-throwing and lays the basis for the develop-
ment of language, which like accurate throwing depends on the brain’s capacity to
orchestrate a series of rapidly changing muscle movements. Indeed, Roach et al.
(2013) showed that Homo erectus had evolved this capacity for accurate overhead
throwing, and recent work suggests that the origins of human language are also
much older than commonly assumed (Dediu and Levinson 2013), originating in all
likelihoodmore than 700,000 years ago.4
4The fossil evidence indicates that hominins developed speech on the order of one Mya. The
hyoid bone is a key element of speech production in humans. Martinez et al. (2008) show that
hominin hyoid bones from 540,000 years ago are similar, and hence were inherited from their last
common ancestor, Homo rhodesiensis, which was from 700,000 to 1,000,000 years ago. Martinez
et al. (2004) use evidence from the acoustical properties of Middle Pleistocene fossil remains of the
hominin inner ear to argue that hominins of this period had auditory capacities similar to those of
living humans.
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9 WARFARE
Fighting between groups ranges from single revenge killings, to careful raids in
which safety of the raiders is as important as inflicting damage on the enemy, to
intensivewarfare with genocidal attacks and face-to-face large-scale battle (Keeley
1996, Kelly 2000, Otterbein 2004, Boehm 2011). Fighting involves assessments of
the relative fighting power of adversaries and of risk (Wrangham and Glowacki
2012), and the array of weapons available to each side obviously enters into these
assessments. The result is an ethnocentric species (LeVine and Campbell 1972)
whose members are predisposed to assume the risks associated with aggression,
especially against outsiders, but also strive to minimize those risks.
All contemporary foragers arm themselves with lethal hunting weapons, and at
times these weapons are deployed by individuals against within-group adversaries
and by the group in executing serious deviants (Knauft 1991, Boehm 1997). Both
types of homicide, while rare, are well documented despite a universal ethos that
strongly discourages killing a group member (Brown 1991). To keep their systems
of social cooperation viable, foragers strive to peaceably adjudicate conflicts within
their midst (Boehm 2000).
These moral inhibitions are relaxed when inter-group rivalry comes into play.
The use of weapons between groups can entail massive casualties when desired co-
operative relations among groups fail and conflict gains the upper hand (Wiessner
1977). However, even given a pattern of recurrent ethnocentric fighting between
groups, hunter-gatherers may succeed in managing these conflicts (Boehm 2013).
While the activemanagement of hostilities is universal within bands, such between-
group efforts remain both sporadic and unpredictable. Weapons render forager
bands very dangerous to one another, and some groups live with such hostilities
with little effort expended to curtail them.
The history of human warfare remains a hotly controversial topic among an-
thropologists. The basic facts themselves are vigorously contested (Turchin 2015).
Some argue that prior to the appearance of settled agriculture, humans approxi-
mated the “noble savage” picture drawn long ago by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. This
view was definitively put to rest by Lawrence Keeley’s War Before Civilization
(1996), but continually pops up in the anthropological literature (Fry 2013). The
opposing view is the Hobbesian picture of the distant past known as the “war of
all against all” (Hobbes 1968[1651]). The evidence against this view is the docu-
mentation of extensive trade networks in hunter-gatherer societies (Adams 1974).
Lying behind this controversy is the notion that if war is ancient, then making war
is part of human nature, whereas if war is modern, then it is a purely cultural and
environmental phenomenon that can be successfully countered by appropriate cul-
tural changes.
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But this is surely an illegitimate dichotomy. The idea that behavior is either in-
nate or culturally determined was given up by sociobiologists long ago. As we have
argued, early humans developed powerful lethal weapons, developed the skeletal
and muscular morphology to use them skillfully, and learned how to cooperate in
collective endeavors through creative politics and leadership. Moreover, anger and
aggression are strong human predispositions. These human capacities allow hu-
mans to make war when ecological and social conditions render war profitable.
Ancient or modern, war is part of how humans are defined as a species. War can
be contained and controlled, but it cannot be ignored, whatever cultural structures
govern future human societies.
10 DOMINANCE AND REVERSE DOMINANCE HIERARCHIES
James Woodburn (1982) classified hunter-gatherer societies into immediate-return
and delayed-return systems. In the former, group members obtain direct return
from their labor in hunting and gathering, with food lasting at most a few days.
The tools and weapons they use are highly portable. In delayed-return foraging
societies, individuals hold rights over valuable assets, such as means of production
(boats, nets, beehives, and the like), and processed and stored food and materials.
These societies exhibit forms of social stratification akin to those in modern soci-
eties: social dominance hierarchies in the form of lineages and clans. However, the
fossil record suggests that delayed-return human society is a quite recent innova-
tion, appearing some 10,000 years ago, although in ecologically suitable locations,
it may have existed earlier (most such locations are now below sea level). Homo
sapiens thus evolved predominantly in the context of immediate-return systems.
The important factor in “delayed return” is not the cognitive capacity for de-
layed gratification or long-range planning, which certainly existed in immediate
return societies, but rather the availability of cumulable material wealth. Material
wealth allows those who seek social dominance to control allies and resources and
thereby thwart the capacity of subordinates to disable and kill them. As long as the
material gains from a position of social dominance exceed the cost of coalition-
building and paying guard labor, social dominance of the sort common in other
primate societies can be reestablished in human society. In fact, the appearance
of farming and private property in land led to high levels of political inequality
in only a few societies, and states with a monopoly in coercive power emerged
only after a millennium of settled agriculture. Nor were early farming societies
more economically stratified than hunter-gatherer societies (Borgerhoff Mulder et
al. 2009). The accumulation of material wealth is thus merely a precondition for
the reestablishment of social dominance hierarchies. To avoid confusion, we will
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call societies that lack forms of material wealth accumulation simple, rather than
immediate-return, societies.
Simple societies,Woodburn (1982) suggests, are “profoundly egalitarian . . . sys-
tematically eliminat[ing] distinctions . . . of wealth, of power and of status.” Fried
(1967), Service (1975), Knauft (1991) and others likewise comment on the egali-
tarian character of simple hunter-gatherer societies. The simple vs. delayed-return
dichotomy is in fact somewhat overdrawn, as there is in fact a continuous range
of variation between the two archetypes. Many Pleistocene humans used some
storage even if they were nomadic and they remained strongly egalitarian. The ma-
jority of the 58 “Late Pleistocene Appropriate” foraging societies coded by Boehm
(2012) (see discussion below), including the !Kung considered by Knauft (1991),
are of an intermediate type. What factors are responsible for such unusual egalitar-
ianism? Here, we will argue it is due to the combination of interdependence and
ability to punish transgressors.
Cut marks on bones suggest that a major investment in large game hunting in-
creased decisively only 250,000 years ago (Stiner 2002) and delegating sharing to
a single butcher began 200,000 years ago (Stiner et al. 2009). In establishing tim-
ing of this transition to heavy reliance on medium-sized game in humans, Stiner
(2002) uses multiple indices including the age structure of prey and cut marks
to suggest that at this time ungulate hunting became prominent in human subsis-
tence. However, cut marks on bones may not be a reliable indicator of how meat
is shared (Lupo and O’Connell 2002). Indeed, if Wrangham and Carmody (2010)
are correct in dating the control of fire by hominins and the cooking of meat, the
problem of the fair distribution of meat among families, especially important in
hard times when only medium- and small-size prey were available, may well have
been solved much earlier. This was likely an early source of egalitarian senti-
ment, as well as providing the material substrate for the development of a social
morality. Contemporary hunter-gatherer societies are often violent and competitive
(Potts 1996), but they almost always distribute large game peacefully, if sometimes
contentiously, based on a commonly accepted set of fairness principles (Kaplan
and Hill 1985b, Kelly 1995, Boehm 2004).
The human ecological niche requires food sharing not only daily, but also on
a longer-term basis due to the occasional injuries or illnesses to which even the
best hunter or gatherer may be subjected (Sugiyama and Chacon 2000, Hill et
al. 2011). Thus each individual forager, especially in the immediate-return form
of foraging, is utterly dependent on the others in their camp, band, or even wider
sharing unit. This strong interdependence dampens the tendency to free-ride on
others’ efforts, and favors strong individual tendencies toward egalitarianism, as
well as sophisticated fairness norms concerning the division of the spoils (Whallon
1989, Kaplan and Hill 1985a).
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Collective hunting in other species does not require a fairness ethic because
participants in the kill simply eat what they can secure from the carcass, and be-
cause dominants are evolved to tolerate subordinates to a point that all the hunters
are adequately nourished. However, the practice of bringing the kill to a central site
for cooking, which became characteristic of hominin societies, is not compatible
with uncoordinated sharing and eating. In the words of Winterhalder and Smith
(1992),
. . . only with the evolution of reciprocity or exchange-based food trans-
fers did it become economical for individual hunters to target large
game. The effective value of a large mammal to a lone forager. . . probably
was not great enough to justify the cost of attempting to pursue and
capture it.. . . However, once effective systems of reciprocity or ex-
change augment the effective value of very large packages to the hunter,
such prey items would be more likely to enter the optimal diet. (p. 60)
Fire and cooking thus coevolved with the emergence of a normative order and
social organization based on ethical behavior.
The second element is that egalitarianism is imposed by the community, cre-
ating what Boehm (1999) calls a reverse dominance hierarchy. Hunter-gatherers
share with other primates the striving for hierarchical power, but among mobile
foragers, social dominance aspirations are successfully countered because individ-
uals do not accept being controlled by an alpha male and are extremely sensitive to
attempts of group members to accumulate power through coercion. When an indi-
vidual appears to be stepping out of line by threatening or killing group members,
he will be warned and punished. If this behavior continues and ostracism does not
work, the group will delegate one member, usually a close relative of the offender,
to kill him. Boehm’s message in Hierarchy in the Forest (1999) is that “egalitari-
anism. . . involves a very special type of hierarchy, a curious type that is based on
antihierarchical feelings.”
We can regard this phenomenon as an extension of the leveling coalitions seen
among primate males (Pandit and van Schaik 2003). Female chimpanzees in cap-
tivity act collectively to neutralize alpha male bullies (de Waal 1996), wild chim-
panzees form large coalitions to banish, badly wound, or even kill high-ranking
males. Bonobos in the wild have been observed to behave similarly. By compar-
ison with humans, however, leveling coalitions among primates are limited to the
genus Pan and generally quite small.
Because of the extremely long period during which humans evolved without
the capacity to accumulate wealth, we have become constitutionally predisposed to
exhibit these antihierarchical feelings. Of course, in modern democratic societies,
there is still enough willingness to bend to authority in humans to ensure that a
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marked or tyrannical social dominance hierarchy remains a constant threat and
often a reality.
Capable leadership in the absence of a strong social dominance hierarchy in
band-level societies is doubtless of critical importance to their success, and lead-
ers are granted by their superior position, and with the support of their followers,
with fitness and material benefits. Leadership, however, is based not on physical
prowess, but rather on the capacity to motivate, persuade, and help the band to
reach a consensus. This account of the growth of intelligence is an elaboration
on the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis (Jolly 1972; Humphrey 1976; Byrne
andWhiten 1988) that stresses the effect of encephalization on enhancing the mean
fitness of group members, not simply advancing the interests of the leader. For re-
cent evidence on leadership in hunter-gatherer societies, see von Rueden (2015)
and von Rueden et al. (2014).
Reverse dominance hierarchy is documented in Boehm (2012). Boehm located
339 detailed ethnographic studies of hunter-gatherers, 150 of which are simple
hunter-gatherer societies. He coded first fifty, and later sixty-five of these societies
from around the world. He calls these simple hunter-gatherer societies “Late Pleis-
tocene Appropriate” (LPA). Despite the fact that these societies have faced highly
variable ecological conditions, Boehm finds that their social organization follows
the pattern suggested by Woodburn (1982) and elaborated by Boehm (1997). The
LPAs exhibit both reverse dominance hierarchy and subscribe to a common human
social morality. This morality operates through internalized norms, so that individ-
uals act prosocially because they value moral behavior for its own sake and would
feel socially uncomfortable behaving otherwise.5
How do we explain this unique pattern of socio-political organization? Wood-
burn attributes this to humans’ access to lethal weapons that neutralize a social
dominance hierarchy based on coercion. “Hunting weapons are lethal,” he writes,
“not just for game animals but also for people. Effective protection against am-
bush is impossible. . .with such lethal weapons” (p. 436). Woodburn adds that “in
normal circumstances the possession by all men, however physically weak, cow-
ardly, unskilled or socially inept, of the means to kill secretly anyone perceived as
a threat to their own well-being. . . acts directly as a powerful leveling mechanism.
Inequalities of wealth, power and prestige. . . can be dangerous for holders where
means of effective protection are lacking” (p. 436).
5The notions of norms and norm internalization (Durkheim 1902; Parsons 1937) are common in
the social sciences. According to the socio-psychological theory of norms, appropriate behavior in
a social role is given by a social norm that specifies the duties, privileges, and expected behavior
associated with the role. Adequate performance in a social role normally requires that the actor have
a personal commitment to the role that cannot be captured by the self-regarding “public” payoffs
associated with the role (Gintis 2003, Gintis and Helbing 2015).
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Boehm (2012) argues that his LPAs inherited from our ancient hunter-gatherer
forbears the capacity to control free-riders through collective policing, using gos-
sip and informal meetings as the method of collecting information concerning the
behavior of group members. Moreover, according to our best evidence, the hunter-
gatherer societies that defined human existence until some 10,000 years ago also
were involved widespread communal and cooperative child rearing (Hrdy 1999,
2000, 2009) and hunting (Boehm 1999, 2012; Boyd and Silk 2002; Bowles and
Gintis 2011), thus tightening the bonds of sociality in the human group and in-
creasing the social costs of free-riding behavior.
Nonhuman primates never developed weapons capable of definitively control-
ling a dominant male. Even when sound asleep, a male chimpanzee reacts to be-
ing accosted by waking and engaging in a physical battle, basically unharmed by
surprise attack. In Demonic Males (1996) Richard Wrangham recounts several
instances where even three or four male chimpanzees viciously and relentlessly at-
tack a male for twenty minutes without succeeding in killing him (but see Watts et
al. 2006). The limited effectiveness of chimpanzees in this regard can mainly be
ascribed to their inability to effectively wield potentially dangerous natural objects,
for instance stones and rocks. A chimpanzee may throw a large rock as part of a
display, but only rarely will it achieve its target.
The human lifestyle, unlike that of chimpanzees, requires many collective deci-
sions, such as when and where to move camp and which alliances to sustain or cut.
This lifestyle thus requires a complex socio-political decisionmaking structure and
a sophisticated normative order. Many researchers incorrectly equate dominance,
as found among chimpanzees, with leadership. In some species, such as gorillas,
dominants can indeed initiate or influence group movements, because others rely
on the dominant male as the main protector and value his proximity. In most human
foragers, there are no such dominants.
Capable leadership in the absence of a social dominance hierarchy in egal-
itarian human societies is of critical importance to their success. However, de-
spite their exceptionally generous treatment of band members, human leaders are
granted by their superior position, and with the support of their followers, with cer-
tain material benefits and fitness (Price and Van Vugt 2014), such as superior mat-
ing opportunities. Leadership, as we have seen, is based not on physical prowess
and coercion, but rather on the capacity to motivate and persuade. Eibl-Eibesfeldt
(1989) and Wiessner (2006), among many others, have stressed the importance in
hominin societies of leadership based on persuasion and coalition building. In dis-
cussing mobile foragers, Wiessner (2009) remarks, “Unlike nonhuman primates,
for whom hierarchy is primarily established through physical dominance, humans
achieve inequalities through such prosocial currencies as the ability to mediate or
organize defense, ritual, and exchange” (pp. 197–198). Interestingly, our closest
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living relative, the chimpanzee, shows a tendency in the same direction, which is
unusual among primates: successful top-ranked males are good social strategists
(Goodall 1986, Nishida and Hosaka 1996).
It is important not to confuse reverse dominance hierarchy, which is based on
a predisposition to reject being dominated, with a specific predisposition for egal-
itarian outcomes. Rather, persuasion and influence become a new basis for social
dominance (Clutton-Brock 2009), which tends to be no less powerful for its sub-
tlety. Wiessner (2006) observes that successful small-scale societies “encourage
the capable to excel and achieve higher status on the condition that they continue
to provide benefits to the group. In no egalitarian institutions can the capable in-
fringe on the autonomy of others, appropriate their labor, or tell them what to do”
(p. 198).
11 ARE THERE EGALITARIAN NONHUMAN PRIMATES?
If there were a multi-male/multi-female primate society lacking a social dominance
hierarchy and lacking lethal weapons, yet exhibiting reverse dominance hierarchy,
the propositions offered in this paper would be compromised. Does such a society
exist? Here, an important distinction can be drawn between egalitarianism flowing
from weak social interaction and a low level of social contestation on the one hand,
and egalitarianism stemming from a high level of interdependence and some form
of subordinate leverage over dominants (Sterck et al. 1997).
While there are clear behavioral patterns in nonhuman primates that serve as
the basis for human reverse dominance hierarchy, all multi-male/multi-female non-
human primate societies are in fact based on strongly expressed social dominance
hierarchies. There may be variation in the degree to which female or male domi-
nance relations are decided and thus their dominance hierarchies are more or less
steep, depending on the strength of contest competition for resources (Sterck et
al. 1997). It is often argued that bonobos (Pan paniscus) are more egalitarian than
chimpanzees and more like humans (de Waal 1997, Hare et al. 2007). However,
except for a female dominance hierarchy in feeding access for infants, the pattern
of dominance in bonobos strongly resembles that of chimpanzees (Furuichi 1987,
1989, 1997), although estimates of the steepness of dominance hierarchies among
males and females are not consistent across studies (Stevens et al. 2007, Jaeggi et
al. 2010) .
Similarly, reports indicate rather thoroughgoing egalitarianism among woolly
spidermonkeys, or muriquis (Strier 1992), which also live in sizeablemulti-male/multi-
female groups, much like those of bonobos and chimpanzees. They are highly
promiscuous and males hardly compete for matings (Milton 1984, Strier 1987).
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In all the primate examples of egalitarianism in sizeable groups, there is a clear
reduction in the intensity of male contest competition as a result of female re-
productive physiology that leads to unpredictable ovulation and thus low potential
monopolization of matings, and thus paternity concentration, by top-ranking males
(van Schaik et al. 2004). Thus these egalitarian social relations are the result of
scramble-like competition.
In none of these societies do we find the interdependence that we observe
in human societies. The closest analogs are the societies of cooperative breed-
ers, as in callitrichids, but these are rarely multi-male/multi-female. Among non-
primates, wild dogs and wolves, which are both cooperative breeders and hunters
(Macdonald and Sillero-Zubiri 2004), came closest, but even there we mostly,
though not always, have a single breeding pair rather than multiple cooperating
pairs. We conclude that, on the basis of available evidence, there are no multi-
male/multi-female egalitarian primate societies except for Homo sapiens.
12 GOVERNANCE BY CONSENT
Following the development of lethal weapons and the suppression of dominance
hierarchies based on physical prowess, successful social bands came to value in-
dividuals who could command prestige by virtue of their persuasive capacities.
While it was by no means necessary that this behavior emerge from the collapse
of a social dominance hierarchy based on force, it did in fact emerge in the human
line, and no other solution to the problem of leadership has been observed in the
primate order. As suggested in th Choreographer interview at the head of this pa-
per, the triumph of the gracile human skeleton over the robust Australopithecines
and other hominids is a strong indication that brain and not brawn was conducive
to individual fitness and best enhanced the fitness of human groups as well.
The human egalitarian solution emerged in the context of bands insisting that
their leaders behave with modesty, generosity, and fairness (Boehm 1993). A saga-
cious and effective leader will attempt to parley an important social position into
material and fitness benefits, but not so much as to induce followers to replace him
with a less demanding leader. Persuasion was the name of the game, and excessive
exercise of power would reverse the leader’s fortunes. Persuasion depends on clear
logic, analytical abilities, a high degree of social cognition (knowing how to form
coalitions and motivate others), and linguistic facility (Plourde 2010). Leaders with
these traits could be effective, but one intemperate move could lead to a fall from
power. Thus in concert with the evolution of an ever more complex feeding niche
(Kaplan et al. 2000), the social structure of hunter-gatherer life in typical gene-
culture coevolutionary fashion contributed to the progressive encephalization and
24
Page 25 of 46
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
the evolution of the physical and mental prerequisites of effective linguistic and fa-
cial communication. In short, two million years of evolution of hyper-cooperative
multi-family groups that deployed lethal weapons to hold down hierarchy gave rise
to the particular cognitive and socio-political qualities of Homo sapiens.
The increased encephalization in humans was an extension of a long primate
evolutionary history of increased brain size, usually associated with increased cog-
nitive demands required by larger group size (Humphrey 1976, Jolly 1972, Byrne
and Whiten 1988, Dunbar et al. 2010).6 The argument presented here, which in-
vokes coordinated collective action in cooperative foraging, made possible by a
combination of interdependence and lethal weapons, extends this analysis to ex-
plain human exceptionalism in the area of cognitive and linguistic development.
This development in promoting egalitarian multi-male/multi-female bands ex-
plains the huge cognitive and linguistic advantage of humans over other species.
The early students of human evolution interpreted human hypercognition as a pro-
cess of runaway sexual selection, in which intelligent individuals were more suc-
cessful in attracting mates but did not otherwise contribute to the fitness of band
members. This was the favored theory of Charles Darwin (1871) and Ronald
Fisher (1930), and more recently of Geoffrey Miller (2001). However, runaway
selection is rare, and if it exists, it is generally a short-term deviation from fitness-
maximizing behavior (Gintis 2009, Pomiankowski 1987). Explaining human intel-
ligence as a product of runaway sexual selection is a first-class just-so story, of the
type so eloquently critiqued by Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin (1979).
Our reading of the evidence suggests that human hypercognition, despite the ex-
treme energy costs of maintaining a large brain, was fitness-enhancing because
of increased cognitive and linguistic ability, which entailed heightened egalitarian
leadership qualities. These leadership qualities increased the fitness of band mem-
bers, who responded by ceding enhanced fitness benefits to leaders (Price and Van
Vugt 2014).
The mating success of high cognition males was thus grounded in their con-
tribution to the mean fitness of band members, and hence in the long run, to the
evolutionary success of ancestral humans. In a sense, hominins evolved to fill a
cognitive niche that was relatively unexploited in the early Pleistocene (Tooby and
DeVore 1987, Pinker 2010).
6Group size is certainly not the whole story. Multi-male/multi-female monkey groups are often as
large as or larger than ape groups, although the latter have much larger brains and are considerably
more intelligent. The full story concerning cephalization in mammals in general, and primates in
particular, remains to be told (Navarrete et al. 2011).
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13 COOPERATIVE MOTHERING: THE EVOLUTION OF PROSOCIALITY
In cooperative breeding, the care and provisioning of offspring is shared among
group members. The standard estimate is that some 3% of mammals have some
form of allomaternal care, but in the order Primates, this frequency rises to 20%
or more (Hrdy 2009, 2010). In many nonhuman primates and mammals in gen-
eral, cooperative breeding is accompanied by generally heightened prosociality, as
compared with related species with purely maternal care (Burkart et al. 2014). The
most plausible explanation is that cooperative breeding leads to a social structure
that rewards prosocial behavior, which in turn leads to changes in neural structure
that predisposes individuals to behaving prosocially (Burkart et al. 2009, Burkart
and van Schaik 2010). An alternative possibility is that there is some underlying
factor in such species that promotes prosociality in general, of which collective
breeding is one aspect.
Human prosociality was strongly heightened beyond that of other primates liv-
ing in large groups, including cooperative breeders, by virtue of the niche ho-
minins occupied, involving coordination in scavenging and hunting, and sophis-
ticated norms for sharing meat. This combination might account for the degree
of cooperative breeding in the hominin line. As hominin brain size increased,
the duration of immaturity did as well (Barrickman et al. 2008), and immatures
had to learn an increasingly large number of foraging and other skills (Kaplan
et al. 2000, Schuppli et al. 2012). Hominins evolved a unique system of inter-
generational transfers that enabled the evolution of ever more complex cognitive
abilities to support ever more complex subsistence skills (Kaplan et al. 2007). Our
uniquely prosocial shared intentionality (Tomasello et al. 2005) can be traced back
to the psychological changes involved in the evolution of cooperative breeding, and
additionally, hunting (Burkart, Hrdy and van Schaik 2009). .
14 LETHAL WEAPONS AND MODERN EGALITARIANISM
The interplay between lethal weapons and our distinctive human politics continues.
In the Holocene, some Big Man societies have been relatively egalitarian, such as
those of highlandsNewGuinea, where the Big Man serves the group in out-feasting
other groups and cannot transmit wealth or prestige to descendants. Other Big Man
societies are much more hierarchical, with prestige and power being transmitted to
future generations. The latter could have led to chiefdoms (Service 1975, Flannery
and Marcus 2012).
The slow but inexorable rise of the state, both as an instrument for exploiting
direct producers and for protecting them against the exploitation of external states
and bands of private or state-sanctioned marauders, was a synthesis of these two
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types of Big Man socio-political systems (Andreski 1968, Gies 1984). Moving to
the Middle Ages, we find that the hegemonic aspirations of states peaked in the
thirteenth century, only to be driven back by the series of European population-
decimating plagues of the fourteenth century. The period of state consolidation
resumed in the fifteenth century, based on a new military technology: the use of
cannon. In this case, as in some other prominent cases, technology becomes the
handmaiden to establishing a social dominance hierarchy based on force.
InPolitics, Book VI, Part VII, Aristotlewrites, “There are four kinds of military
forces—the cavalry, the heavy infantry, the light armed troops, the navy. When the
country is adapted for cavalry, then a strong oligarchy is likely to be established
[because] only rich men can afford to keep horses. The second form of oligarchy
prevails when the country is adapted to heavy infantry; for this service is better
suited to the rich than to the poor. But the light-armed and the naval elements
are wholly democratic. . .An oligarchy which raises such a force out of the lower
classes raises a power against itself.”
The use of cavalry became dominant in Western Europe during the Carolin-
gian period. The history of warfare from the late Middle Ages to the First World
War was the saga of the gradual increase in the strategic military value of infantry
armed with longbow, crossbow, hand cannon, and pike, which marked the recur-
ring victories of the English and Swiss over French and Spanish cavalry in the
twelfth to fifteenth centuries (Turchin and Korotayev 2006). Cavalries responded
by developing dismounted tactics when encountering infantry, using heavy hand
weapons such as two-handed swords and poleaxes. These practices extended the
viability of cavalry to the sixteenth century in the French and Spanish armies, but
gradually through the Renaissance, and with the rise of Atlantic trade, the feudal
knightly warlords gave way to the urban landed aristocracy and warfare turned to
the interplay of mercenary armies consisting of easily trained foot soldiers wield-
ing muskets and other weapons based on gunpowder. Cavalry remained important
in this era, but even in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, cavalry was used
mainly to execute the coup de grace on seriously weakened infantry.
The true hegemony of the foot soldier, and hence the origins of modern democ-
racy, began with the perfection of the hand-held weapon, with its improved accu-
racy and greater firing rate than the primitive muskets of a previous era. Until that
point, infantry was highly vulnerable to attack from heavy artillery. By the early
twentieth century, the superiority of unskilled foot soldiers armed with rifles was
assured. World War I opened in 1914 with substantial cavalry on all sides, but
mounted troops were soundly defeated by men with rifles and machine guns, and
thus were abandoned in later stages of the war. The strength of the political forces
agitating for political democracy in twentieth century Europewas predicated on the
strategic role of the foot soldier in waging war and defending the peace (Bowles
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and Gintis 1986), simply because conscripted armies of foot soldiers lacked the
moral resolve to defend a society from whose governance they were systematically
excluded.
15 THE LONG-TERM EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SOCIALITY
It is tempting to focus on the past several thousand years of human cultural history
in modeling human socio-political organization because the changes that occurred
in this period so radically and rapidly transformed the character of human society
(Richerson and Boyd 2004, Pagel 2012). However, the basic genetic predispo-
sitions of humans underlying socio-political structure were forged over a much
longer period of time, whence the million plus year perspective offered in this pa-
per.
The framework developed here is applicable to many spheres of human social
life, although we have applied it only to the evolution of socio-political structure.
The central tool is gene-culture coevolution, which bids us pay close attention to
the long-term dynamic interplay between our phylogenetic constitution and our
cultural heritage. The second important conceptual tool is the socio-psychological
theory of norms (Gintis 2016). Many social scientists reject this theory because
it posits a causal social reality above the level of individual actors. This position
is sometimes termed methodological individualism. Methodological individualism
is not a philosophical, moral, or political principle, but an assertion about reality.
As such, it is simply incorrect, because social norms are an emergent property
of human society, irreducible to lower-level statements (Durkheim 1902, Gintis
2009). All attempts at explaining human culture without this higher-level construct
fail.
In this context, we have suggested the following scenario for the long history of
human socio-political dynamics. Our primate ancestors evolved a complex socio-
political order based on a social dominance hierarchy in multi-male/multi-female
groups. Enabled by bipedalism, environmental changes made a diet of meat from
large animals fitness-enhancing in the hominin line. This, together with cultural
innovation in the domestication of fire, the practices of cooking, and of collec-
tive child-rearing created a niche for hominins in which there was a high return
to coordinated, cooperative, and competitive scavenging, as well as technology-
based extractive foraging. This development was accompanied by the likely use
of clubs, spears, and long-range projectiles as lethal weapons, and also led to the
spread of specialized bipedalism and the reorganization of the upper torso, shoul-
ders, arms, and hands to maximize the effectiveness of these weapons. There was
also a growth of new neural circuitry allowing the rapid sequencing of bodilymove-
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ments required for accurate weapon deployment.
The hominin niche increasingly required sophisticated coordination of collec-
tive meat procurement, the occasional but critical reliance on resources produced
by others, a complementary willingness to provide others with resources, and pro-
cedures for the fair sharing of meat and collective duties. The availability of lethal
weapons in early hominin society could have helped to stabilize this system be-
cause it undermined the tendencies of dominants to exploit others in society. Thus
two successful socio-political structures arose to enhance the flexibility and effi-
ciency of social cooperation in humans and likely their hominin ancestors. The
first was the reverse dominance hierarchy, which required a brain large enough to
enable a band’s rank-and-files to create effective coalitions that could definitively
put an end to alpha male hegemony and replace this with a lasting egalitarian order.
Leaders were kept weak, and their reproductive success depended on an ability to
persuade and motivate, coupled with the rank-and-file ability to reach a consensus
with such leadership. The second was cooperative child rearing and hunting, which
provided a strong psychological predisposition towards prosociality and favored
internalized norms of fairness. This system persisted until cultural changes in the
later Holocene fostered material wealth accumulation, through which it became
once again possible to sustain a social dominance hierarchy based on coercion.
This scenario has important implications for political theory and social policy,
for it suggests that humans are predisposed to seek individual dominance when this
is not excessively costly, but also to form coalitions to depose pretenders to power.
Moreover, humans are much more capable of forming large, powerful, and sustain-
able coalitions than other primates, due to our enhanced cooperative psychological
propensities. Such coalitions also served to reinforce the moral order, as well as
to promote cooperation in hunting, warding off predators, and raiding other human
bands. This implies that many forms of socio-political organization are compatible
with the particular human amalgam of hierarchical and anti-hierarchical predispo-
sitions that can result in either independent egalitarian bands or well-amalgamated
large societies.
In particular, this implies that there is no inevitable triumph of liberal demo-
cratic over despotic political hierarchies. The open society will always be threat-
ened by the forces of despotism, and a technology could easily arise that irremedi-
ably places democracy on the defensive. Perhaps the most important threat to free-
dom and democracy would be the development of robots that could replace foot
soldiers in war and crowd management. The problem with current robot models is
insufficient energy storage—nothing like mitochondria and ATP exist in the non-
organic world (Gintis 2015). Nevertheless, the future of politics in our species, in
the absence of concerted emancipatory collective action, could well be something
akin to George Orwell’s 1984, or Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World. However,
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humans appear constitutionally indisposed to accept a social dominance hierarchy
based on coercion unless the coercive mechanism and its associated social pro-
cesses can be culturally legitimated. It is somewhat encouraging that such legiti-
mation is difficult except in a few well-known ways, based on patriarchy, popular
religion, or principles of liberal democracy.
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Strong social interdependence plus availability of lethal weapons in early hominin society 
undermined the standard social dominance hierarchy. 
The successful political structure that replaced the ancestral social dominance hierarchy was an 
egalitarian political system in which the group controlled its leaders. 
The heightened social value of non-authoritarian leadership entailed enhanced biological fitness 
for such traits as linguistic facility, political ability, and human hypercognition. 
This equalitarian political system persisted until cultural changes in the Holocene fostered 
accumulation of material wealth, when a social hierarchy with authoritarian leaders could again 
be sustained. 
